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TRIBAL COURT CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER
NON-INDIANS: TESTING THE LIMITS OF
RETAINED SOVEREIGNTY
The concept of inherent tribal sovereignty occupies a prominent posi-
tion in the development of American Indian law.' Despite its significance,
the limits of retained sovereign power remain uncertain because of a history
of inconsistent judicial, congressional, and administrative approaches to the
status of Indian tribes. The assertion of tribal court jurisdiction over non-
Indian offenders on Indian territory illustrates this confusion. In Olphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,2 the U.S. Supreme Court excluded criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians from the sphere of sovereign authority. The Court
grounded its decision on the "inherent limitations on tribal powers' 3 and
ignored the interest of the tribe in exercising jurisdiction.4 In so doing, the
Court declined the opportunity to formulate a reasonable scheme of juris-
diction and severely limited the force of the concept of inherent sovereignty.
This Note first examines the jurisdictional issue in the context of the
concept of inherent sovereignty. The Note then proposes a jurisdictional
theory that avoids the pitfalls of Oihant.
I
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIANS
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RETAINED SOVEREIGNTY
In 1940, nearly a century after the U.S. Government finally reduced
the American Indian to the status of its ward, the Department of the Inte-
rior stated the fundamental principles of retained sovereign power:
(1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any
sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative
power of the United States and, in substance, terminates the external powers
of sovereignty of the tribe,. . .but does not by itself affect the internal sover-
eignty of the tribe .... (3) These [internal] powers are subject to qualifica-
tion by treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus
I. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122-50 (1942); Martone, Ameri-
can Indian Tribal Self-Government in the Federal System: Inherent Right or Congressional
LicenseZ 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 600 (1976).
2. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
3. Id. at 209.
4. See id. at 212.
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expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the
Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of government.5
This statement merely describes the theory of retained sovereignty; it fails
to distinguish between external and internal powers. The limits of retained
sovereignty are to be found in this distinction.
Rooted in the conquest and territorial acquisition by the Europeans,
retained sovereignty was firmly established through the Federal Govern-
ment's recognition of the inherent sovereign power of the Indian tribes.6
Between 17787 and 1871,8 the United States ratified 370 Indian treaties.9
Until the last decade of the treaty period, the Federal Government drafted
Indian treaties in the terms of international diplomacy, t0 regulating war
powers, boundaries, passports, extradition, and foreign relations." Many
of the early treaties expressly recognized Indian jurisdiction over non-
Indians dwelling on Indian lands.12 The use of the treaty power,13 as well
as the form and scope of the treaties, reflected an implicit assumption that
the tribes, although subject to the sovereign powers of the United States,
retained attributes of sovereignty.
5. F. COHEN, supra note I, at 123 (footnotes omitted). The 1958 revision of the HAND-
BOOK contains an identical characterization. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 398 (1958).
6. The claim to inherent sovereignty, recognizing that Indian tribes were once sovereign
states, has its origin in traditional doctrines of international law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 4 (1965), which defines "state" as "an
entity that has a defined territory and population under the control of a government and that
engages in foreign relations." See generally J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 155-56 (6th ed. 1967).
Further analysis of retained sovereignty in terms of international law is unproductive, how-
ever, because retention of internal powers does not ordinarily follow complete conquest. One
commentator, applying the general rules of territorial acquisition to the history of North
American Indians, concluded that "the effect of conquest and cession leaves the Indian tribes
with no internationally recognizable claim to sovereignty over any of the territory now part of
the United States. The fact is that Indian tribes were conquered, subjugated, and cast into a
position of virtual subordination." Martone, supra note I, at 602.
7. Treaty between the United States and the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13.
8. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1976). The Act
provided that, prospectively, no tribe would be recognized as an independent nation with
which the United States may contract by treaty.
9. Martone, supra note 1, at 605.
10. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 39. Similarly, Chief Justice Marshall noted that the words
"treaty" and "nation" in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and art. VI, cl. 2, apply to Indians in the
same sense as to other nations. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832).
11. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 39-40.
12. See, e.g., Treaty between the United States and the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanoes,
Ottawas, Chipewas, Putawatimes, Miamis, Eel-river, Weeas, Kickapoos, Piankashaws, and
Kaskaskias, Aug. 3, 1795, art. VI, 7 Stat. 49, 52; Treaty between the United States and the
Cherokees, July 2, 1791, art. VIII, 7 Stat. 39, 40; Treaty between the United States and the
Creeks, Aug. 7, 1790, art. VI, 7 Stat. 35, 36. See also, Clinton, Development of Criminal Juris-
diction over Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 951, 953-55 (1975).
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Retained sovereignty, an inference raised by the U.S. Government's
use of the treaty power, has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in
varying degrees.14 Chief Justice Marshall gave the earliest complete judi-
cial characterization of the political status of the Indian tribes in Worcester
v. Georgia.15 The State of Georgia had imprisoned a New England mis-
sionary who had settled on Cherokee land with tribal consent. The Court
held that this imprisonment exceeded the authority of the state on the basis
of the exclusive federal power to regulate intercourse with Indians.' 6 The
Court construed the treaties and acts of Congress as establishing that Indian
nations "had always been considered as distinct, independent political com-
munities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed posses-
sors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that
imposed by irresistible power."' 17 The U.S. Government recognized Indian
authority within tribal boundaries to be "exclusive."' 8
Marshall did not expressly state whether the tribal powers of self-
government derived from the Cherokee treaties or from inherent Indian
sovereign power not divested by the Federal Government, and his broad
discourse on sovereign powers within the context of a discussion of treaties
muddles the opinion.' 9 Nevertheless, the Cherokee nation was recognized
as a semi-autonomous political entity exercising sovereign powers over a
defined territory.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia20 reflects the difficulty that would continue
to plague the Court so long as it attempted to resolve controversies on the
basis of the "status" of Indian tribes. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for a
majority of the Court, stated that the Cherokee nation was not a foreign
state for the purpose of invoking the original jurisdiction of the Court, but
14. The judicial development and reaffirmation of inherent tribal sovereignty may be
traced from Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 554-55 (1832). See United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959) (no state civil
jurisdiction over Indian lands absent federal statute); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-83
(1896) (Bill of Rights inapplicable to Indians); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82
(1886). But see McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (noting
erosion of the concept of inherent sovereignty).
15. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
16. Id. at 559-61.
17. Id. at 559.
18. Id. at 557.
19. See F. COHEJ, supra note 1, at 123; Martone, supra note 1, at 621. Cohen's analysis of
Worcester as an unequivocal affirmation of inherent sovereignty represents the time-honored
view. Martone suggests that the basis of the holding in Worcester was a treaty guarantee of
self-government.
20. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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occupied an uncertain middle ground that he characterized by the phrase
"domestic dependent nation."2 1
Subsequent Court decisions 22 reaffirmed the uncertain status of Indian
tribes:
They were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent
position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as
nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a sepa-
rate people. with the power of regulating their internal and social rela-
tions. 
23
More recently, the Court recognized that "Indian tribes are unique aggrega-
tions possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory." 24
United States v. Wheeler,25 decided shortly after Oli6hant, presented
the issue of whether tribal power to enforce criminal laws against tribal
members derives from the retained inherent sovereignty of the tribe or from
the sovereignty delegated to it by the Federal Government. Concluding
that tribal judicial power flows from retained sovereign powers, Justice
Stewart wrote:
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited char-
acter. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete
defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign
powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not
withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of theirdependent status.2 6
B. LIMITS OF RETAINED SOVEREIGNTY
Despite the Court's repeated affirmations of the quasi-sovereign status
of the tribes, the limits of retained tribal sovereignty remain uncertain.
Affirmative acts of Congress constitute the principal express limitations on
retained sovereign powers; limitations implicit in the conflict between tribal
sovereignty and the superior sovereignty of the United States are the major
sources of the uncertainty.
21. Id. at 17.
22. See cases cited in note 14 supra.
23. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886) (congressional assumption of
federal jurisdiction over Indians pursuant to the Indian Appropriation Act of Mar. 3. 1885, § 9,
23 Stat. 362 (now codified as the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976)), upheld on basis
of plenary federal power over Indian affairs).
24. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (congressional delegation of power
to a tribe to regulate sale of alcoholic beverages on the reservation upheld) (citation omitted).
25. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
26. Id. at 323.
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L Express Limitations of Sovereign Power
In 1934, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior analyzed the
relationship between tribal sovereignty and acts of Congress:
Each Indian tribe begins its relationship with the Federal Government as a
sovereign power, recognized as such in treaty and legislation. The powers of
sovereignty have been limited from time to time by special treaties and laws
designed to take from the Indian tribes control of matters which . . . these
tribes could no longer be safely permitted to handle. The statutes of Con-
gress, then, must be examined to determine the limitations of tribal sover-
eignty rather than to determine its sources or its positive content. 27
The power of Congress to limit the retained sovereign powers of Indian
tribes, unquestioned by the Court,28 flows from the superior sovereignty of
the Federal Government in the guardian-ward relationship. In a recent
decision, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,2 9 the Court acknowledged the
breadth of congressional power, stating that "Congress has plenary author-
ity to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which
the tribes otherwise possess. '" 30 Although express limitations of sovereign
power by treaty or statute are conclusive, a history of inconsistent and ill-
conceived Indian legislation has promoted confusion in the area of criminal
jurisdiction.3 t
Early treaties commonly addressed three jurisdictional situations. 32
First, Indians who committed the murder or robbery of U.S. citizens were
to be delivered to federal authorities and tried according to state or territo-
rial law. Second, U.S. citizens who committed murder or robbery of Indi-
ans were to be tried in the same manner. Third, U.S. citizens illegally
settling on Indian lands forfeited federal protection and the tribe might
"punish [them] or not, as they please." 33 Later treaties typically did not
contain express provisions for federal jurisdiction.34 Only one treaty, the
first entered into between the United States and an Indian tribe, provided
27. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 19 (1934).
28. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-68 (1903); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376, 379-80, 384 (1896); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379-81 (1886).
29. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
30. Id. at 56 (citation omitted).
31. See generally Clinton, supra note 12; Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands:
A Journey through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIz. L. REV. 503 (1976).
32. See, e.g., Treaty between the United States and the Creeks, Aug. 7, 1790, arts. VI,
VIII, IX, 7 Stat. 35, 36-37; Treaty between the United States and the Wiandot, Delaware,
Ottawa, Chippewa, Pattawatima and Sac Nations, Jan. 9, 1789, arts. V, IX, 7 Stat. 28, 29-30;
Treaty between the United States and the Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1785, arts. V, VI, VII, 7 Stat. 18,
19.
33. Treaty of Aug. 7, 1790, supra note 32, art. VI.
34. See, e.g., Treaty between the United States and the Pottawatomies, Nov. 15, 1861, 12
Stat. 1191; Treaty between the United States and the Dwamish, Suquamish, and other Tribes,
Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927.
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for tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians other than those illegally set-
tled on Indian land.35 Thus, in any particular jurisdictional controversy,
express provisions of a treaty may or may not provide federal criminal
jurisdiction.
Among legislation expressly limiting tribal sovereign powers,36 three
statutes profoundly affect the criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts: 18
U.S.C. § 1152,37 the Major Crimes Act,38 and the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968. 39 Section 1152 extends the general criminal laws applicable in fed-
eral enclaves to Indian land, but excepts certain classes of Indian offenders.
Section 1152 does not expressly deprive tribal courts of criminal jurisdic-
tion; nor does it indicate whether the federal jurisdiction that it confers is
exclusive or concurrent. Application of the rule that Indian legislation
should be construed in the Indian interest4° leads to the conclusion that
federal jurisdiction under section 1152 is concurrent.4 1 Ultimately, the stat-
ute fails to establish a concise distribution of jurisdiction.
Exparte Kenyon,42 the only federal case prior to Oliphant involving
tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, supports the opposing
position that section 1152 confers exclusive federal jurisdiction. Kenyon, a
35. Treaty between the United States and the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, art. IV, 7 Stat. 13,
14. See 435 U.S. at 199 n.8. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 45-46; Clinton, supra
note 12, at 953-57.
36. See also 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976). Section 1321 permits a state to exercise criminal and
civil jurisdiction over Indian country with the consent of the tribe affected. State exercise of
criminal jurisdiction in compliance with the terms of this section precludes the assertion of
tribal court jurisdiction.
37. Originally enacted as § 25 of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, 4 Stat.
729, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1976) provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States
as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States. . . shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person
or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by
treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to
the Indian tribes respectively.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976). The original statute, the Indian Appropriation Act of Mar. 3,
1885, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, was enacted in response to consternation over the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (denying federal jurisdiction over an
Indian who committed murder on a reservation). F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 147.
39. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976).
40. "[L]egislation affecting the Indians is to be construed in their interest .... " United
States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 599 (1916). See also Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14,
19 (1934) (statutes that "appear to limit the powers of an Indian tribe are not to be unduly
extended by doubtful inference").
41. The ninth circuit used this approach and reached the same conclusion in Oliphant.
Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1976). The ninth circuit upheld tribal court
jurisdiction on the basis of inherent tribal sovereignty. Id. at 1009.
42. 14 F. Cas. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720).
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non-Indian convicted in a Cherokee tribal court for an off-reservation lar-
ceny, filed a petition for habeas corpus. The occurrence of the offense
outside of Cherokee territory provided sufficient grounds for the court's
conclusion that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction.4 3 Accordingly, the U.S.
Supreme Court later noted that the assertion in Kenyon that tribal court
jurisdiction extended only to Indian offenders, 44 made without reference to
supporting authority, was dictum 45 The Department of the Interior, how-
ever, relied on Kenyon to justify the broad conclusion that tribal courts lack
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,4 6 and administrative practice has
been premised solely on the questionable authority of this nineteenth cen-
tury source.47
The Major Crimes Act establishes federal jurisdiction over ten offenses
committed by any Indian "against the person or property of another Indian
or other person."'48 The Act reflects no congressional intent to create fed-
eral jurisdiction over major crimes committed by non-Indians. The appar-
ent negative inference is that Congress assumed the basis of tribal court
jurisdiction to be the citizenship of the offender rather than the territory on
which the crime is committed. But a congressional presumption, raised by
negative inference, is not conclusive on the jurisdictional issue.49
The Indian Civil Rights Act extends provisions similar to those of the
Bill of Rights50 to Indian tribal governments. The Act does not restrict the
scope of sovereign powers that may be exercised but does limit their man-
ner of exercise. The provisions of the Act, extending guarantees to "any
person,"5' neither expressly nor implicitly address jurisdiction.
No act of Congress has denied tribal court criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. Indian legislation raises reasonable inferences of a presumed
absence of jurisdiction, but inferences are ultimately inconclusive. Further-
43. Id. at 355.
44. Id.
45. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 108 (1884). In Ohihant, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, was of the opinion that the Kenyon court "held" tribal court jurisdiction to be limited
to Indian offenders. 435 U.S. at 200.
46. 77 Interior Dec. 113 (1970) (withdrawn 1974); see F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 148.
47. See M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 171-74 (1973).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976). The offenses are murder, manslaughter, rape, incest, assault
with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny. Id.
49. 435 U.S. at 206. The Court has not yet considered whether the Major Crimes Act
confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 325 n.22 (1978). Passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 mooted the issue by
limiting the punishment that can be imposed by tribal courts to a $500 fine and six months
imprisonment. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1976).
50. U.S. CONsT. amends. I-X. The Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tribes. Talton
v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
51. Thus, should tribal courts be granted criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the guar-
antees of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 would extend to non-Indians.
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more, treaty provisions concerning jurisdiction reflect that presumption
even less forcefully.
2 Implicit Limitations of Sovereign Power
Certain limitations on sovereign powers inhere in the conflict between
tribal sovereignty and the superior sovereignty of the United States. Indian
exercise of external sovereign powers, such as the conduct of foreign rela-
tions, would clearly conflict with federal interests.52 At the opposite
extreme, the sovereign power of internal self-government would not conflict
with overriding federal sovereignty.5 3
No test to identify predictably those sovereign powers that have been
implicitly lost has emerged from the Supreme Court. Justice Stewart
recently noted that the "areas in which such implicit divestiture of sover-
eignty has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations
between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe."'54 The tribes, how-
ever, retain sovereign power over certain affairs affecting tribal nonmem-
bers.55 The jurisdictional question raised in Oiphant occupied a gray area
of the law lying between external and internal powers.
C. OLIPHAVT V SUQUAMISH INDI4N TRIBE
In 01phant,5 6 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether tribal courts can exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for
acts occurring on Indian reservations. Petitioner Oliphant, arrested by Su-
52. In Cherokee Nation . Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall observed that Indian tribes are
"so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any attempt to
acquire their lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would be considered by all as
an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility." 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17-18.
53. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (sovereign power to prosecute tri-
bal members for tribal offenses not implicitly lost); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)
(assertion of state-court civil jurisdiction over action arising on Indian territory where tribal
forum available is infringement on right of self-government).
54. 435 U.S. at 326.
55. In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), a non-Indian store proprietor on the Navajo
Reservation brought suit in state court to recover goods from Indian defendants despite the
availability of a tribal forum. Although Williams involved a tribal-state jurisdictional ques-
tion, the Court's reasoning is fully applicable to the issue of implicit divestiture: "There can be
no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of
the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians
to govern themselves." Id. at 223.
56. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). For commentary on the Ol0hant decision, see Gross, Indian Se#/-
Determination and Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis ofRecent Federal Indian Policy, 56 TEx. L.
REv. 1195 (1978); McCoy, The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty: Accommodating Tribal, State,
and Federal Interests, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 357 (1978); Note, O1ohant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe: A Jurisdictional Quagmire, 24 S.D.L. REV. 217 (1979), and Tribal Sovereignty
and the Supreme Court's 1977-1978 Term, 1978 B.Y.U.L. REv. 911.
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quamish tribal officers during a tribal celebration on the Port Madison Res-
ervation, was charged with assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest.5 7
A second petitioner was charged by tribal authorities with reckless endan-
germent and destruction of tribal property.5 8 Both were non-Indian resi-
dents of the Port Madison Reservation.5 9
The Suquamish tribal government had adopted in 1973 a Law and
Order Code conferring original jurisdiction on the tribal court, concurrent
with federal jurisdiction, over the territory of the reservation and over per-
sons, both Indian and non-Indian, located there.60 Notices were placed at
the entrances to the reservation warning that entry onto it would be deemed
implied consent to tribal court jurisdiction.6 1
After examining the pertinent treaty and relevant statutes, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Court, invalidated the exercise of
tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on the grounds of the
existence of inherent limitations on Indian sovereign power. In their
treaty,62 the Suquamish "acknowledge[d] their dependence on the govern-
ment of the United States" and "agree[d] not to shelter or conceal offenders
against the laws of the United States."63 The Suquamish did not expressly
relinquish tribal court jurisdiction and the Court recognized that the treaty
provisions "[b]y themselves. . . would probably not be sufficient to remove
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians if the Tribe otherwise retained such
jurisdiction." 64 Nevertheless, "the addition of historical perspective" 65 led
the Court to deny the existence of such jurisdiction. After reviewing the
prominent case authorities, 66 the Court concluded that the "history of
Indian treaties. . . is consistent with the principle that Indian tribes may
not assume criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians without the permission
of Congress."' 67 Accordingly, treaties silent on the jurisdictional question
are interpreted as reflecting the general recognition that the tribes could not
57. 435 U.S. at 194. Tribal court proceedings were stayed pending decision on a writ of
habeas corpus filed in the district court. Id. Both the district court and the court of appeals
denied Oliphant's petition. Id.
58. Id.
59. Non-Indians owned approximately 63% of the reservation land and constituted 98% of
the population. Id. at 193 n.l.
60. Id. at 193.
61. Id. at 193 n.2.
62. Treaty between the United States and the Dwamish, Suquamish, and other Tribes,
Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927.
63. Id, art. IX, 12 Stat. at 929.
64. 435 U.S. at 208.
65. Id. at 206.
66. Id. at 207-11. See text accompanying notes 14-24 supra.
67. 435 U.S. at 197 n.8.
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assert such jurisdiction.68 Thus, the provisions of the Treaty of Point
Eliot,69 placed in historical perspective, suggested the absence of Suquam-
ish criminal jurisdiction.70
A review of federal legislation7' led the Court to conclude that Con-
gress shared the presumption of the executive branch and the lower courts
that tribal courts lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 72 The Court
determined that Congress believed that the prohibition of tribal assertions
of jurisdiction was "the necessary result of its repeated legislative
actions. '73 The Court recognized that this shared presumption is not con-
clusive, however,74 and ultimately rested its decision on the concept of
implicit limitations of sovereign powers.
The court of appeals recognized in its Of10hant decision that the tribes
retain "those powers of autonomous states that are neither inconsistent with
their status nor expressly terminated by Congress. ' 75 Powers "inconsistent
with their status" are those that would "interfere with or frustrate the poli-
cies of the United States."'76 The court found the exercise of tribal court
criminal jurisdiction to be consistent with tribal status. First, the provisions
of the Suquamish Law and Order Code under which Oliphant was charged
did not "punish conduct otherwise privileged or authorize actions otherwise
illegal under federal law." 77 Second, the exercise of tribal court jurisdiction
was consistent with recent federal policy encouraging tribal governance. 78
The "inconsistent with their status" test fails to provide principled
guidelines for its application. Because the status of the tribes is ill-defined,
the test amounts to little more than a conclusory label. Justice Rehnquist
68. Id.
69. See note 62 supra.
70. The Court acknowledged that courts should construe treaty provisions in favor of the
tribes, 435 U.S. at 208 n. 17, but interpreted the provisions here consistently with its view of the
historical perspective.
71. Id. at 201-06. In addition to 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1976), see note 37 and text accompany-
ing notes 39-47 supra, the Major Crimes Act, see note 38 and text accompanying notes 48-49
supra, and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, see note 39 and text accompanying notes 50-51
supra, the Court considered at length the unenacted Western Territory Bill, see H.R. REP. No.
474, 23rd Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1834).
72. 435 U.S. at 206.
73. Id. at 204.
74. Id. at 208. Justice Rehnquist noted that the shared presumption "carries considerable
weight" but failed to indicate how that weight figured in the decision. Id. at 206. It is proba-
ble that he conducted the historical review to buttress the independent judicial conclusion that
tribal court jurisdiction is inconsistent with the status of the tribes.
75. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976).
76. Id. at 1012.
77. Id.
78. 1d. at 1013.
[Vol. 13:89
TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTION
applied the ninth circuit's test but reached the opposite result. He started
from the premise that the United States' interest in protecting its citizens
against "unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty" is "central to the
sovereign interests of the United States."'79 He then noted that the power to
try and criminally punish non-Indians, a restriction of personal liberty, is
an "important manifestation" of U.S. sovereignty.80 By yielding their full
sovereign status to the United States, then, Indian tribes relinquished this
attribute of sovereignty. Permitting the exercise of tribal criminal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians "would belie the tribes' forfeiture of full sovereignty
in return for the protection of the United States."'' s Thus such tribal court
jurisdiction could not be exercised.
Three weaknesses are apparent in the Court's analysis. First, implicit
in the Court's argument is the unsubstantiated assumption that tribal courts
are unable to protect U.S. citizens against unwarranted intrusions on their
personal liberty.8 2 But the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 guarantees Indi-
ans and non-Indians freedom from such unwarranted intrusions. 83 Second,
the Court acknowledged but refused to give weight to the tribal interest in
asserting criminal jurisdiction over its territory.84 Third, the Court's ration-
ale would support the argument that Indians, as U.S. citizens, are entitled to
federal rather than only tribal criminal forums for protection against
unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty.85 Such a result would
severely limit the scope of the retained sovereign power of self-government.
Thus a jurisdictional scheme should be developed that adequately balances
the competing federal and tribal interests.
79. 435 U.S. at 210.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 211.
82. Id. at 210-11. Justice Rehnquist relied on the antiquated language of Ex parte Crow
Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) to suggest that racial and social differences negate the possibility of a
fair trial in tribal court for a non-Indian.
83. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976). The provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 are
substantially equivalent to those of the Bill of Rights, with exceptions rendered immaterial by
other federal statutory limits on the powers of Indian tribal governments. For example, 25
U.S.C. § 1303 (1976) provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall be available for federal
court review of the legality of detention by an Indian tribe. The Act does not, however, re-
quire that its provisions be judicially interpreted identically to the Bill of Rights. See Tom v.
Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976); Howlett v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233
(9th Cir. 1976).
84. 435 U.S. at 212. The Court considered this balancing to be a legislative function.
85. The argument would not be likely to succeed in the form of an equal protection chal-
lenge. In Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979), the Court upheld a
Washington statute that created a "checkerboard" pattern of tribal and state-court civil juris-
diction, holding that the statute "is fairly calculated to further the State's interest in providing
protection to non-Indian citizens living within the boundaries of a reservation while at the
same time allowing scope for tribal self-government on trust or restricted lands." Id. at 502.
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II
A NEW JURISDICTIONAL THEORY:
REASONABLENESS
At the time of the Olphant decision, 33 of the existing 127 tribal court
systems purported to extend criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.8 6 Far
from reflecting traditional socio-religious rules or procedures,87 tribal
courts merely duplicate the function of nontribal legal systems.88 More-
over, the tribal legal systems are beset by incompetence.8 9 Thus, the cur-
rent state of justice in tribal courts weighs against the expansion of their
jurisdiction. But the O/1hant Court's denial of jurisdiction conflicts with
the current federal policy of encouraging tribal self-government. 90 The
Court's result also ignores the expressed fears of tribal members that non-
Indians committing offenses on Indian land or against Indian persons are
not adequately punished by nontribal legal systems. 9'
O1ovhant accords with the trend away from a theory of jurisdiction
based on territory towards a theory of jurisdiction based on citizenship. 92
Although the Oli6hant Court did not directly address this distinction, its
opinion amounts to an unqualified rejection of territorial jurisdiction. The
choice of one of two extremes achieved a result that is definitive but, under
some circumstances, unreasonable. A standard of jurisdiction that is more
principled, flexible, and reasonable than that established by O/16hant is nec-
essary.
The proposed jurisdictional approach is premised on notions of rea-
sonableness and fairness: tribal jurisdiction is appropriate when the tribal
86. 435 U.S. at 196.
87. S. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS 9-10 (1978). The vast majority of
tribes lost their traditional legal systems during the process of repeated physical displacement
and exposure to white society. Id.
88. Id. at 91 n.86. Brakel notes that "[t]he Indian tribes in this country are fragmented
remnants of a past culture almost wholly absorbed by and dependent on the surrounding con-
temporary culture; the tribal courts are almost wholly duplicative of surrounding nontribal
institutions." Id. In addition, he argues that "the justice dispensed in the tribal courts repre-
sents nothing more or less than an effort to copy white man's precepts and white man's institu-
tions." Id. at 92.
89. Id. at 104-1I. Brakel attributes the sorry state of tribal legal systems to a lack of
skilled and experienced personnel, insufficient funds, lack of a tradition of professionalism,
and inadequate trial preparation.
90. For discussions of recent federal legislation implementing this policy, see Israel, The
Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and its Impact on Reservation Resource Development, 47 U.
COLO. L. REV. 617, 624-30 (1976); McCoy, supra note 56, at 393-94.
91. See 435 U.S. at 212 n.18. The ninth circuit noted in its Olohant opinion that non-
Indians frequently go unpunished for minor offenses because of crowded court dockets, the
confused jurisdictional scheme, and the distances separating witnesses and evidence from the
courthouses. 544 F.2d at 1013-14.
92. Clinton, supra note 12, at 955.
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interest in providing a forum outweighs the federal interest in providing a
forum.93 Focusing on the interests present in the particular controversy
incorporates elements of the citizenship and territorial arguments but
moderates those extremes to produce a jurisdictional continuum. Accord-
ingly, criminal activity that is merely territorial, for example, a marijuana
sale between non-Indian nonresidents in Indian territory, presents insuffi-
cient tribal interests to confer tribal court jurisdiction.
U.S. Supreme Court decisions provide guidelines for the distribution
of jurisdiction on the basis of the interest of the forum in the controversy.
The Court has balanced interests in both tribal-federal 94 and tribal-state95
jurisdictional controversies, emphasizing the tribal interest in self-
government. Similar principles governing jurisdiction have emerged in the
area of state-court assertions of personal jurisdiction.96 The Court's deci-
sions focus on the level of defendant's activity within the forum and its
relatedness to the litigation,97 and the most practical and reasonable
forum.98 Thus concepts of reasonableness analogous to those proposed are
well-developed in jurisdictional law.
The facts of Oli0hant may be used to demonstrate the process of bal-
ancing the interests of the tribal forum against those of the Federal Govern-
ment. Oliphant was charged with assaulting a tribal police officer and
resisting arrest on Suquamish tribal land during a tribal celebration. 99 The
93. McCoy, supra note 56, at 399, notes that this balancing of interests is analogous to the
interest-analysis approach developed by conflict of laws scholars. McCoy argues that interest-
analysis is emerging as a useful approach to civil jurisdictional controversaries in tribal-state
and tribal-federal relations, but does not propose that this approach should supplant the Oli-
phant decision in the area of criminal jurisdiction. Conflict of laws interest-analysis is not
ordinarily applied to criminal law. No choice of law problem can arise because "[n]o state will
punish a violation of the criminal law of another state." RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 427 (1934). Nevertheless, the proposed approach to criminal jurisdiction draws upon
considerations analogous to those used in conflict of laws interest-analysis.
94. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (1978) ("tribal courts are important
mechanisms for protecting significant tribal interests. Federal pre-emption of a tribe's jurisdic-
tion to punish its members for infractions of tribal law would detract substantially from tribal
self-government .... ) See also McCoy, supra note 56, at 408-22.
95. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959):
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial that respon-
dent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian
took place there.
See also McCoy, supra note 56, at 401-08.
96. See generall, von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A SuggestedAnal-
sis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966).
97. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945).
98. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
99. 435 U.S. at 194. Suquamish authorities had anticipated crowd control problems dur-
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Suquamish interests in asserting jurisdiction over Oliphant were sufficiently
strong to support jurisdiction: the offense, although minor, significantly
affected the integrity and capability of the tribal police; the offense directly
disturbed the peace and security of the reservation community; and the
offense was against tribal personnel. No overriding federal interest in pro-
viding a forum existed. The ninth circuit noted in its Olihant opinion that
federal law is not designed to regulate minor offenses, nor are federal
authorities anxious to prosecute for such offenses.' 00 In addition, the dis-
tance from the reservation to the federal courthouse may present a federal
prosecutor with difficulties in gathering evidence and obtaining wit-
nesses.10 1 Under the proposed jurisdictional theory, the tribal court's juris-
diction would have been upheld.
The federal interest in asserting jurisdiction over perpetrators of minor
crimes normally is nominal or nonexistent. Under the proposed jurisdic-
tional scheme, tribal courts would extend jurisdiction to minor crimes that
substantially affect law and order in the tribal community, involve tribal
property and personnel, or concern matters of essential tribal policy. Fed-
eral jurisdiction would encompass those crimes not embraced by substantial
tribal interests, matters of substantive federal policy regardless of tribal pol-
icy,' 0 2 and crimes for which Congress has expressly provided federal or
state jurisdiction.10 3
CONCLUSION
The Oli6hant Court, free to identify those sovereign powers "inconsis-
tent" with Indian tribal status, created an unreasonable distribution of
jurisdiction between tribal and federal courts. Although it accords with the
ing the celebration and had requested county law enforcement assistance. One deputy was
assigned for one eight-hour period during the weekend. The Bureau of Indian Affairs
responded to a request for assistance with neither funds nor personnel. Oliphant was arrested
in the early morning hours when only tribal officers were available. 544 F.2d at 1013.
100. Federal law is not designed to cover the range of conduct normally regulated by
local governments. Minor offenses committed by non-Indians within Indian reserva-
tions frequently go unpunished and thus unregulated. Federal prosecutors are reluc-
tant to institute federal proceedings against non-Indians for minor offenses. ...
Traffic offenses, trespasses, violations of tribal hunting and fishing regulations, dis-
orderly conduct and even petty larcenies and simple assaults committed by non-
Indians go unpunished.
544 F.2d at 1013-14 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 27-28).
101. Id.
102. For example, despite a tribal code prohibition on the sale of a drug and the substantial
tribal interest in protecting the reservation community through its drug laws, the interest of the
Federal Government in an integrated drug enforcement program may outweigh the tribal
interest. Close cases should be resolved by granting jurisdiction to the superior sovereign.
103. E.g., Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976).
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current trend away from jurisdiction based on territorial sovereignty, it fails
to consider adequately competing tribal and federal interests. By eliminat-
ing the theories of territoriality and nationality from the jurisdictional test,
irrational disparities of treatment based on race can be discarded and tribal
law can be more consistently applied.
Tribal courts should be empowered to assert criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians within the limits of inherent sovereignty through an approach
that weighs the interests of the tribe against those of the United States.
Because judicial creation of a jurisdictional scheme on a case-by-case basis
is prohibitively cumbersome, Congress should act to identify the proper
forum for specific offenses or classes of offenses.1°4 Congress must also
address the present ineffectiveness of tribal courts to guarantee all criminal
defendants meaningful justice. 105
Richard A. Samuels
104. The Major Crimes Act, id, is an example of such a statute.
105. Brakel offers recommendations for tribal court reform including improved legal train-
ing on the reservations, the use of lay advocates, mandatory factual investigations by judges,
improved pre-trial screening of cases, improved judicial selection, and the use of local lawyers
as appellate judges. S. BRAKEL, supra note 87, at 104-09.
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